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I find I incorporate gneiss, coal, long-threaded moss, fruits, grains, esculent roots, 
And am stucco’d with quadrupeds and birds all over, 
And have distanced what is behind me for good reasons, 
But call any thing back again when I desire it. 
 
This brief excerpt from Leaves of Grass (1965, 59) by Walt Whitman (1819-1892) expresses 
in poetic language a unique relationship to nature. It attests to a radical decentering of the 
self, giving voice to an experience of nature itself,1 both mineral and vegetal, beyond any 
specific point of view. In short, nature is appreciated for its elementary presence, as an 
unfathomable and mysterious whole.2 
This decentering of the self reflects a point of view that could be called the “View from 
Nowhere” as Thomas Nagel so aptly called it (1986). It is not an absence of perspective, but 
rather one from a subjective, particular viewpoint. Nagel has in mind the objective, 
conceptual “third-person” viewpoint through which material phenomena are apprehended 
by the natural sciences, as opposed to the subjective qualities of lived experience, 
perceptible only in reference to a “first-person” perspective. According to the author, these 
qualities elude scientific knowledge. In this context, the singularity of the quote from 
Whitman’s book consists in expressing an experience (probably ephemeral) of the view from 
nowhere. Thus, this expression does not signify here the conceptual objectivity of science. 
Indeed, this experience demonstrates a perspective—of nature—that appears “objective” 
to the subject, yet is not conceptual: the poet’s experience would thus involve a point of 
view that is never specific, or to use another of Nagel's well-known expressions, “There is 
something it is like to be…” neither this nor that, to be nothing coming from a privileged 
perspective (1974, emphasis added). 
The experience of nature illustrated in the verse from Leaves of Grass (or my interpretation 
of it) is paradoxical to say the least, since it involves a “first-person” experience from a 
“third-person” point of view. It is not nearly an experience of myself in the “third person,” 
but also an experience of others in the “first person.”3 It seems to me to reflect, on 
anaesthetic level, one of the rare descriptions expressed by Arne Naess regarding self-
                                                        
1
The preposition “of” in the expression “experience of nature” must be understood here with the double 
meaning of “possessive” and “genitive.” In the genitive sense, it involves an experience of nature experienced 
by the poet; in the possessive sense, the expression suggests the experience is undergone by nature. 
2
See the note from the editors about poem number 30 as a whole (Whitman 1965, 58-59). 
3
 In technical terms, one could say this experience combines an allocentric type of “first person” perspective 
with an egocentric type of “third person” perspective (Gallagher 2002, 244). 
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realization, a description that incidentally is based on Gestalt psychology: “Gestalts bind the 
I and the not-I together in a whole. Joy becomes, not my joy, but something joyful of which 
the I and something else are interdependent, non-isolatable fragments” (Naess 1989, 60-
61). And he continues with this poetic evocation: “‘The birch laughed/with the light easy 
laughter of all birches…’ This gestalt, he says, is a creation which may only incompletely be 
divided to give an I which projects laughter into a non-laughing birch tree” (Naess 1989, 60-
61). 
This idea of a “deep, comprehensive and ecological self” (Naess 1989, 175) was later 
clarified by philosophers of deep ecology such as Freya Mathews (1991) and Warwick Fox 
(1995) in particular. It has found fertile ground for expansion in phenomenology (Brown and 
Toadvine 2003; Vakoch and Castrillón 2014; Bannon 2016) and in psychology (Roszak, 
Gomes, and Kanner 1995; Rust and Totton 2012). But to my knowledge it has never been 
approached from an aesthetic perspective. This essay thus aims to clarify the signification of 
the ecological self and its underlying identification from the point of view of environmental 
aesthetics, in order to establish its legitimacy.  
From this point of view, an experience of nature as described and illustrated in the above 
verse by Whitman raises the question of knowing if there exists an aesthetic theory capable 
of accounting for it. From the end of the 1970s, the philosopher Allen Carlson (1977, 1979 
and 2004) showed the legitimacy of an aesthetics of nature, as distinct from fine arts 
aesthetics, and developed to that end a highly convincing cognitive model of aesthetic 
appreciation. 
That model is extremely relevant in understanding the specificity of an aesthetic 
appreciation of the natural environment as compared to the aesthetics of fine arts. Carlson 
himself (2008, 2010) underlined the advantages of his model, which has provided among 
other things a theoretical basis for the positive aesthetics so dear to proponents of pristine 
nature and wilderness; it has also ensured the objectivity of aesthetic judgment that is vital 
for public policies to preserve the landscape. However, this model has struggled to give an 
account of an experience of nature like the one expressed in Whitman’s verse, where the 
relationship between subject and object of aesthetic experience has virtually disappeared. 
Indeed, in Carlson’s model the environment remains the objective correlative of an 
intentional relationship. 
Beginning in the 1990s, Carlson’s reflection prompted several alternative propositions that 
have greatly contributed to developing the field of environmental aesthetics. Among these 
propositions, an aesthetic sometimes known as the “mystery model” (Carlson 2014, 18) was 
elaborated by Stan Godlovitch (2004). This model endorses the idea that in order to 
appreciate nature “on its own terms” (Saito 2004, 141), it must be grasped through the 
point of view from nowhere. But at the same time, Godlovitch’s model leads to an 
understanding of nature similar to one championed at one stage by a friend of Naess, the 
philosopher Peter Reed (1989), as an alternative to ecological self-realization, namely of 
nature’s absolute otherness. Nevertheless, I think we can use Godlovitch’s model to explore 
answers in the field of environmental aesthetics that are analogous to those put forward by 
Naess (1999) in the field of ecophilosophy. As I see it, adopting the point of view from 
nowhere toward nature—not in the sense of the sciences’ objectivity to be sure, but rather 
in the sense of a return to the lived body—corresponds on an aesthetic level to ecological 
self-realization. This essay even suggests that such a realization is in fine aesthetic in nature. 
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In order to understand how the response to Godlovitch’s model is an alternative capable of 
illustrating an aesthetic signification of the ecological self and the identification process 
upon which it is based, later in this discussion (1) I will briefly introduce Godlovitch’s model 
to show both its valuable contribution and its limits. Then, (2) I will develop another model 
of the aesthetics of mystery that is more relevant to the nature of aesthetic experiences, 
namely sensibility and the body. To do this, I will draw on contributions from 
phenomenology, in particular the French philosopher Maurice Merleau-Ponty, who is rarely, 
if ever, referred to in philosophical discussions on environmental aesthetics. Finally, (3) with 
the alternative model of an aesthetics of mystery, I will focus on exploring two underlying 
themes in Godlovitch’s reflections that are never addressed directly: the mystical and death. 
The first of these two themes is often linked to the concept of the ecological self. Unless I 
am mistaken, the latter has never been linked in this way, but an acentric aesthetics of 
nature makes it possible to suggest a kind of affinity between the experience of death and 
the ecological self. 
Within the framework ofenvironmental aesthetics, this study strives to shed new light on 
Naess’ ecological self and the identification through which it can be realized. A well-
understood aesthetics of the mystery of nature is in my view capable of making a crucial 
contribution to the significance of an ecological self. But more broadly, the present 
investigation also allows us to renew the meaning of a vision of nature conveyed by a long 
tradition in Western philosophy in which nature is seen as mysterious (Hadot 2006). 
 
1. Godlovitch’s Mystery Model 
“Should an aesthetic appreciation of nature require us to respect scales of space and time 
which may have little significance from a human-centered perspective? If so, isn’t it curious 
that the aesthetic dimension, rooted firmly and, some may argue, necessarily in the realities 
of human perception, should have to disavow that very limit when directed to the natural 
sphere?” (Godlovitch 2004, 109)  
Godlovitch asks these questions about things in nature, the aesthetic value of which might 
bear no relation to the scale of a human life, either temporally or spatially. They reflect the 
mysterious side that emerges from an aesthetic experience of nature. This mystery is a 
constant in the long Western history of humanity’s relationship to nature.4 
From the standpoint of very long geological time, for instance, the current Arctic thawing 
from climate change might seem insignificant on an aesthetic level. Conversely, if we were 
to live for only a few days or months, every block of ice that broke off the ice shelf could 
quite well be catastrophic. On a spatial level, naturally we can compensate for our 
perceptive limits. With the help of technical instruments such as microscopes and satellites 
we are capable of seeing what is either too small or too far away for human perception. But 
we are thereby introducing an intermediary between the observer and the object observed. 
                                                        
4
Hadot (2006) shows in a convincing manner the dual attitude that can be adopted regarding nature, as 
evidenced by the entire history of Western philosophy. On the one hand, the Promethean attitude strives to 
appropriate nature’s secrets through scientific and technical knowledge; on the other hand, the Orphic 
attitude seeks to be initiated into the mysteries of nature through art and speculative philosophy, rather than 
to overcome its resistance by forcing out its secrets. 
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That intermediary breaks off the physical immediacy or “somatic engagement” dear to 
Berleant (2004, 80-81), a feature of the aesthetic appreciation of the environment. 
Godlovitch holds that an aesthetics of nature founded on human sensibility is necessarily 
arbitrary. Biological limitations constitute a bias that determines the kind of objects liable to 
be appreciated. Humans in fact suffer from the “sensory parochial” (Godlovitch 2004, 112). 
One could object that this kind of anthropocentrism is inevitable, its limits pertaining to our 
human condition. Natural aesthetics is therefore a centric type of aesthetics. Yet, to 
appreciate “nature as a whole” (Godlovitch 2004, 110), the author thinks that only an 
acentric vision of the environment will do. On an ethical level, it is entirely possible to find a 
way out of (moral) anthropocentrism, as a number of ethicists have suggested after Aldo 
Leopold (1949), without achieving true acentrism.5 Would it be possible to achieve it 
through environmental aesthetics? The difficulty of such an endeavor lies in the fact that all 
aesthetics—and, consequently, the aesthetics of nature—are by definition dependent on 
the senses and, more broadly, on sensibility. A truly acentric aesthetics must therefore go 
beyond “a sensory experience in the ordinary sense” and imagine a “non-sensory 
experiential framework” (Godlovitch 2004, 112).  
Carlson’s cognitive approach imagines the aesthetic experience of nature in that way. 
However, we have seen this as incompatible with the experience of an unfathomable and 
mysterious nature expressed by Whitman. And yet, admiration and respect, love and other 
feelings—of mysticism or of the sublime—are no more adequate, according to Godlovitch, 
in capturing the mystery of nature. Indeed, all these experiences of the environment remain 
expressions of a particular point of view. For Godlovitch, only one attitude can lead us to 
see the unknowable or the mysterious in nature: “aesthetic aloofness” and “insignificance” 
(2004, 121). 
We appreciate nature aesthetically as a whole and as mysterious when we perceive it 
through a perspective that is “from nowhere” (Nagel 1986). Yet this point of view can only 
be attained once any privileged point of view has been transcended, whether of an animal 
or a mere organism. A non-sensory experience of the environment expressing that 
perspective consists therefore in the subject’s insignificance and aesthetic aloofness. “From 
that perspective one experiences the world from any of an infinite number of points of view 
from which the viewer and, generally by parity, we do not matter at all. This gives us Nature 
as categorically other than us, a Nature of which we were never part” (Godlovitch 2004, 
121). It is precisely through an experience free of any specific point of view that the viewer 
is insignificant and that nature can be seen as totally foreign and self-sufficient, and 
completely detached from us.  
For Godlovitch, as I have said, an experience of the view from nowhere with an attitude of 
insignificance and aloofness is a non-sensory experience. It appears to be so because, 
through insignificance, the subject of perception has vanished from the experience. But it 
                                                        
5
Godlovitch thinks that all forms of centrism fail to grasp nature as a whole. Patho-, bio- and even eco-centrism 
are all conceptions that perceive nature in a particular way and are only perspectives, clearly broader than 
anthropocentrism but nevertheless always one-sided and representing specific interests. Nature—with a 
capital “N” in Godlovitch's vision—has “neither parts nor tradition nor history” (Godlovitch 2004, 110). A truly 
acentric environmentalism thus requires in his view an acentric aesthetic that is alone capable of grasping 
nature as it really is.  
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also appears that through aloofness it is the world that vanishes, through its radical 
externality. If this interpretation is correct, we must recognize that this conception of an 
acentric aesthetic is curious to say the least; it borders on an oxymoron. For it is hard to see 
in what way it would still constitute not only an aesthetics of nature but also an aesthetics 
of nature. With his understanding of the view of nowhere, Godlovitch leaves nature on one 
side and sensibility on the other. For Carlson, aesthetic experience is non-sensory because 
the viewer is a knowing subject regarding a known object—the environment. But what is 
left of aloofness in the sense implied by Godlovitch? Nothing at all—the radical externality 
of nature implies that there is no longer a correlate for aesthetic appreciation. In this 
conception of aloofness, Godlovitch’s acentric aesthetic turns, in my view, into an aesthetics 
of existence for which nature no longer holds any importance. And in so doing, it is the 
human subject that no longer has its place in nature. 
On reflection, Godlovitch’s conception of the insignificance of the subject and the world’s 
aesthetic aloofness could prove to be an inaccurate conclusion (externalized vision, radical 
difference from nature) inferred from true premises (the absence of a privileged point of 
view, insignificance and aloofness). We can try to reconstruct Godlovitch’s inference in the 
following way: a truly acentric aesthetic requires a perspective from nowhere (or the 
absence of a privileged point of view); this perspective is demonstrated through 
insignificance and aloofness; from these two premises, a conclusion is then inferred 
according to which nature is radically exterior to and different from us. Consequently, 
depending on the sense given to the first premise (a residue of objectivism), it will influence 
the second premise (an attitude of aloofness and insignificance), which, together with the 
former, will determine the conclusion (nature as radically other).  
An objectivist bias regarding acentrism would thus explain the radical sense attributed to 
the concept of aloofness. Nevertheless, unless one takes into consideration certain 
psychological pathologies, it is in fact impossible to be aesthetically detached in the sense 
intended by Godlovitch, in other words to feel completely external to nature. The author 
seems to give in to what philosopher of science Michel Bitbol calls a scientific “blind spot” 
(Bitbol and Eliasson 2014, 8). This expression evokes the oversight—constantly recalled by 
phenomenologists—that nature always exists for a consciousness, which is not necessarily a 
subject, an I. The philosophical tradition of phenomenology can help to correct Godlovitch’s 
conception of acentric aesthetics on this point. 
Thus, if this aesthetic aspires to be an environmental aesthetic, it must refer to a sensorial 
experience of nature,6 while being an experience of the view from nowhere. The latter 
indeed supposes the insignificance of the subject. It also presumes a form of aloofness. 
However, I suggest that this aloofness does not signify externality with regard to nature: 
                                                        
6
Godlovitch feels that while science may reach beyond human sensibility, it remains subject to human 
frameworks in attempting to understand the world as it is (2004, 116-117). In this sense, it humanizes nature. 
In his view, only an aesthetic attitude of insignifiance and aloofness makes it possible to go beyond a human 
perspective. Yuriko Saito (2004, 144) perceives very well such a challenge when aesthetic experience of 
nature, like in acentric experience, is seen as non-sensory aesthetic experience: “our aesthetic experience, she 
says, begins and ends with the sensuous surface” (149). In her view, this need for sensibility in aesthetic 
experience does not prevent one from appreciating nature “on Its Own Terms” (as in the title of her article), 
whether due to scientific knowledge, myths or indigenous and folklore traditions. 
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one can be detached from inside the world by simply giving oneself over to whatever arises.7 
And the latter can be apprehended from a perceptive experience referring to a body rather 
than to a subject or self-awareness. All things considered, we should be thinking about a 
different conception of the view from nowhere. Nagel sees the view from nowhere as 
coming from the natural sciences. As for me, I propose seeing it as coming from pure 
experience (Nishida 1990, 3-4), in other words, unfiltered by any subject (knowing, 
psychological, social)—outside of all thought or judgment, and coextensive with the world. 
 
2. Acentric Aesthetic Experience from a Phenomenological Perspective  
To my knowledge, research by the French philosopher Merleau-Ponty is rarely evoked in 
discussions on environmental aesthetics. Mentions can be foundin Berleant's work (1992), 
for example, or more recently in Klaver (2014), Cooper (2016), and Jóhannesdóttir (2016). 
The originality in his way of thinking lies in its disclosure of a layer of lived experience of the 
world that involves a sensing through my own body: I sense the world, in other words I see 
the brightly colored oak leaves in the autumn, I hear the wind rustling through the trees in 
the woods, I smell the air after a storm, etc. There is a conscious life apart from one’s 
personal life. This conscious life is that of my body—of my eyes, my hands, and my ears 
(Merleau-Ponty 2012). By revealing the existence of a lived body, Merleau-Ponty 
contributed a great deal to de-objectifying the world, which ultimately remains a world 
perceived through our bodies.  
However, in his 1945 work The Phenomenology of Perception, the world remains “still a 
world as intended by a subject” (Brook 2005, 356). In particular in his posthumous work 
from 1964, The Visible and the Invisible, Merleau-Ponty strives to radicalize the process of 
de-objectifying the world by introducing the concept of flesh. The book completes the job of 
dissolving subjects as ontologically separate from nature by returning to the lived body. 
Where are we to put the limit between the body and the world, since the 
world is flesh? Where in the body are we to put the seer, since evidently 
there is in the body only “shadows stuffed with organs,” that is, more of the 
visible? The world seen is not “in” my body, and my body is not “in” the 
visible world ultimately: as flesh applied to a flesh, the world neither 
surrounds it nor is surrounded by it. A participation in and kinship with the 
visible, the vision neither envelops it nor is enveloped by it definitively. The 
superficial pellicle of the visible is only for my vision and for my body. But the 
depth beneath this surface contains my body and hence contains my vision. 
My body as a visible thing is contained within the full spectacle. But my 
seeing body subtends this visible body, and all the visibles with it. There is 
reciprocal insertion and intertwining of one in the other. (Merleau-Ponty 
1968, 138) 
                                                        
7
 This mental state is the last phase in the phenomenological method as described in detail by Depraz, Varela, 
and Vermersch (2003, 37-41) and Bitbol (2014, 161): a phase of “letting go” in which one opens up to the 
unheard of, to what has not yet been subjected to any categorization or conceptual objectification. Note that 
this phase is preceded by two others: suspending intentionality toward the world (the epoché) and shifting 
attention to acts of consciousness. 
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This notion of flesh, the expression of a non-dualist ontology, has given rise to two 
interpretive schools of thought noted by Bryan E. Bannon (2011). The first suggests 
understanding flesh from perceptive experience. As flesh, the body apprehends itself as 
perceiving things in the world and, through that very perception, as a thing among the 
things in nature. In doing so, it lives as part of the world, incorporated within it; it 
experiences itself as part of nature. Nevertheless, while seeing, touching and smelling 
nature, it is nature that sees it, touches and smells it, precisely because it is part of the 
sensible it perceives. Sensing, the body is also sensed; and it is not only sensed by itself, but 
also by the whole sensible, because by feeling the sensible, starting with its own body, it 
belongs to that sensible and is surrounded by it. This version of the flesh is held by Abram 
(1996) and Toadvine (2009) in particular, despite their numerous differences. It conceives of 
the world not only as a sensed world, but also as a sentient world. 
The second school of thought championed by Bannon interprets flesh as an element of 
being, or a new definition of the essence of things. This proposition consists in freeing 
oneself from lived experience in order to imagine the flesh in purely relational terms where 
“flesh is a manner in which a body relates to others through its immediate contact with 
them” (Bannon 2011, 344). The flesh of a thing is the core or relational field through which 
it is open to its environment.8 In Merleau-Ponty’s terms, the flesh of the world is therefore 
not being in itself but rather “is of the Being-seen, i.e. is a Being that is eminently percipi, 
and it is by it that we can understand the percipere” (Merleau-Ponty 1968, 250). In relation 
to the body itself, the flesh of the world means that “this perceived that we call my body 
applying itself to the rest of the perceived, i.e. treating itself as a perceived by itself and 
hence as a perceiving, all this is finally possible and means something only because there is 
Being, not Being in itself…but the Being that also contains its negation, its percipi” (Merleau-
Ponty 1968, 250-251).  
These two interpretations of flesh nevertheless clearly suppose a form of reflexivity inherent 
in the body. That reflexivity is at work in the duplicity of sentience, evoked earlier by 
Merleau-Ponty, between the sentient and the sensible, between the seer and the visible. 
Although seeing, the body itself is a visible thing, and as a visible thing in the visible world, it 
nevertheless sees. And yet this reflexivity does not prevent the “strange adhesion of the 
seer and the visible” (Merleau-Ponty 1968, 139), which the author understands as a 
reversibility of sensing between the sentient body and the sensed body.9 To use Merleau-
Ponty’s paradigmatic example, between my right hand touching an object and my right 
hand touched by my left hand, there is reversibility, but it is “always imminent and never 
realized in fact” (Merleau-Ponty 1968, 147). That imminence is due to the non-simultaneity 
of the two experiences. Thus, reversibility does not involve a coincidence between the 
sentient body and the sensed body. A distancing that is both temporal and reflective, 
however subtle, prohibits it.10 
                                                        
8
 Note that this same idea of a relational field is also present in Naess’s work (1989, 54-55). 
9
 Merleau-Ponty uses other words too in The Visible and the Invisible to express this idea: “intertwining” (130), 
“chiasm” (130, 160), “ramification” (136). 
10
 I do want to mention in this context the original and recent attempt of Sparrow (2015) to work out a post-
phenomenological conception of lived body in nature which replaces Merleau-Ponty’s reversibility of flesh by 
plasticity. Based on the non-phenomenological layer of sensation (accessible through its effects), bodies are 
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And yet, doesn’t Merleau-Ponty’s reminder quoted above that “there is Being” lead us to 
suppose all the same a kind of coincidence at the very core of reversibility between the 
sentient and the sensed? This hypothesis strives in fact to combine the two schools of 
thought described earlier by Bannon: it sees the flesh of the world as a physical experience, 
but a non-reflective one, signifying being, not the perceived being yet, but being that 
contains its own negation, its percipi, before unfolding. Thus, it consists in bringing together 
the two interpretive options instead of opposing them, by trying to mitigate them through 
each other. This is not what Merleau-Ponty says, but rather what he might have said, after 
ridding himself once and for all from any references to the Cartesian cogito. 
Indeed, in The Visible and the Invisible Merleau-Ponty gives up on defending the idea of a 
tacit cogito, an idea still present in Phenomenology of Perception (1968, 170-171). Outside 
the visible world, of the percipi, one finds not being in itself, but the actual, fleeting and 
instantaneous emergence (or arising)—here and now—of a “there is Being.” Acknowledging 
the possibility of that simple actuality, in the present moment, of the experience of being in 
the moment when it occurs, prompts the thought that the reversibility of sentience indeed 
confirms a form of coincidence—specific to the flesh—between the sentient body and the 
sensed body, between the seer and the visible. This coincidence occurs outside the 
inevitable distance introduced by reflexivity and temporality. 
It is true that Merleau-Ponty doesn’t talk about a coincidence between the sentient and the 
sensed. However, he suggests that “nothing” separates them, “the ‘Nothing,’ the ‘Void,’ 
which has the capacity for receiving the plenitude of the world, or either which needs it to 
bear its own emptiness” (1968, 52). This “nothing”—which is thus not nothing—provides 
the justification for introducing the idea of a coincidence within the reversibility of the 
sentient in the context of an aesthetic of nature characterizied by the appreciation of nature 
“on Its Own Terms” (Saito 2004, 141) and by the insignificance of the subject and aloofness. 
Such an aesthetic indeed reveals the “nothing” as being the very stuff of that coincidence. If 
such is the case, how can it manifest on the reflective level, knowing that it characterizes 
the experience of being in the present moment as it arises? Two reflective modalities of 
sentience seem to be rooted in this experience and to preserve its flavour: the imagination 
and expression. 
The flesh, as I said, designates the “sensed world” (through the sentient body), a world 
which, through my body’s being part of the world is the “sentient world.” The “is” translates 
a double dynamic: on the one hand, an imaginative coincidence between the sentient body 
and the sentient world through the sensible; on the other hand, an expressive coincidence 
between the sensed world and the sentient world through experience. With regard to 
imaginative coincidence, it appears to prompt two of the four modalities of imagination 
clearly identified by Brady (2004, 162-163): first there is the ampliative imagination that 
creates and invents new ways of seeing through an amplification of what is perceived by 
going beyond the mere projecting of images. It combines visualizing and leaps of 
imagination, making it possible to consider natural objects from totally new points of view. 
                                                                                                                                                                            
“plastic” in so far as they are material. Such a plasticity enables therefore a new vision of the aesthetic relation 
between self and its environment. In contrast, my view is not post-phenomenological but hyper-
phenomenological in that, like Sparrow, it points at a non-reflexive level of the lived body but maintains at the 
same time the transcendental status of it. 
The Trumpeter 
ISSN 0832-6193 
Volume 33, No. 1 (2017) 
 
Gérald Hess 9 
Revelatory imagination is then the inventive power of the imagination taken to its limit and, 
for Brady, “this often gives way to new ideas and meanings; revelation in the non-religious 
sense” (2003, 157). This kind of imagination is very close to what Ronald Hepburn calls the 
“metaphysical imagination” which allows us, for instance, to see landscape as “cosmically 
ominus” (2004, 127) and to experience aesthetically stones, leaves, and clouds, as well as 
nature as a whole. 
As for expressive coincidence, it designates here, according to Merleau-Ponty’s definition of 
the expression, “the property of a phenomenon, through its internal organization, to make 
known another [phenomenon] that is not or never has been known” (Merleau-Ponty 2011, 
48).11 In this sense, the sensed or perceived world is an expression of the sentient world; it 
“contains that emerging truth about the world” generated by the ampliative and revelatory 
modes of the imagination (Merleau-Ponty 2011, 48). Thus, expression is not the result of a 
projection through which one sees the sensed world like the sentient world. It is not an 
interpretation of the sensed world, but an immediate perception of the sentient world in 
the sensed or perceived world. That said, there is nothing to prevent an interpretation of 
this immediate perception at a later date. The view from nowhere, which is to say the 
absence of any particular perspective or the world as a whole, can therefore be expressed in 
my physical, sensory experience. It is so because my body is part of the sensible world, 
which is the stuff that feeds my imagination.  
The double—imaginative and expressive—coincidence described above is fostered in 
certain situations, or in the case of certain natural events: I can see the origin of life in the 
color or shape of a sunrise or the immensity and infinity of space in the deep and clear view 
from the top of a mountain; I can feel the seasonal atmosphere in the rain on my face 
during a summer storm or in the smell of lilacs when walking in the spring; I can touch the 
matter of the universe itself in the texture of the granite when I am rock climbing; I can hear 
Earth’s elemental forces in the wind howling past two cliffs in the mountains or in the 
silence of the desert; and so on. But, in principle, perception of all natural phenomena can 
become an expression of the view from nowhere, as evidenced by Whitman’s verse quoted 
at the beginning of this essay: gneiss, fruits, coal, long-threaded moss, the esculent 
roots….12 
To conclude, the flesh of the world—beneath the illusory duplicity between the sentient 
body and the sensed body—constitutes a pure experience. On an imaginative and expressive 
level, the latter is immediate and without thought (reflexion) or judgment,13 where the 
difference between the subject and object has not yet occurred (Nishida 1990, 3-4; Bitbol 
2014, 55-56).14 I do not perceive the colour and form of a sunrise first in order to then 
                                                        
11
 See also Cassirer’s (1965) notion of the function of expression.  
12
 The famous passage from A Sand County Almanac titled “Thinking Like a Mountain” where Leopold tells his 
experience of a she-wolf’s death can be interpreted as a prelude of such a coincidence. In watching the fierce 
green fire in the eyes of the wolf, Leopold perceives “something new” (1949, 130), something which he will 
understand few decades later: the ecological point of view of the mountain itself. 
13
 For Godlovitch (1998) aesthetic appreciation does not necessarily involve an evaluation or an aesthetic 
judgment. 
14
 In supporting the idea that acentric aesthetic experience is a pure experience, my aim is to underline the 
particularity of the perception of the mystery of nature. Such an experience radicalizes the process of de-
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interpret it as the origin of life. The colour or form of the sunrise expresses the origin of life 
in the very present moment of the act of seeing. In the aesthetic attitudes of aloofness and 
the insignificance of the subject, the actual sightof the color or form of a sunrise is both the 
point of departure for imaginative activity and the point of arrival of the expressive activity. 
These two activities are indissociably condensed in the present moment of perceptive 
consciousness. In an acentric aesthetic experience of nature, marked by the subject’s 
insignificance and aloofness, nature also becomes the flesh of the world, but a flesh that is a 
pure experience; in other words the very actuality of a perceptive act that joins (ampliative, 
revealing) imagination and expression without distinguishing them. 
Furthermore, an acentric aesthetic experience is ineffable not in the sense in which the 
sensed world would be (the colour of a sunrise, the clear view from the top of a mountain, 
the texture of granite, etc.), but in the sense where the sensed world is the expression of 
the sentient world (the origin of life, the immensity and infinity of space, the matter of the 
universe, etc.), i.e. the view from nowhere that is also the view from an infinity of points of 
view.15 
Reconsidered through the prism of this interpretation of the flesh of the world, acentric 
environmental aesthetics shows what I propose to call the “invisible” aspect of flesh, in 
other words the mystery of nature. Through the viewer’s insignificance and aesthetic 
aloofness, due to the physical sensations produced by the sensible world, it is the world 
itself as a whole that is expressed in those sensations. It does so according to its own point 
of view—the view from nowhere—but always and only through the imagination. By 
becoming insignificant to myself, I return to that physical state of sensations apart from my 
personal life and social identity. By becoming aesthetically aloof from the world, I adopt the 
mind’s point of view, but from inside the world, through my body. That aloofness is 
ultimately analogous to what the stoic sages advocated. An acentric aesthetics of nature, as 
proposed through phenomenological exploration, as such resolves in its way—via the 
imagination—the issue of the relationship between mind and matter. Insignificance and 
aesthetic aloofness dispel the very issue at hand. 
 
3. Death and the Mystical  
Godlovitch advocates the idea that an acentric aesthetics of nature striving to transcend the 
observer’s point of view is similar to a truly mystical attitude, and even to death. 
Unfortunately, he doesn’t delve any deeper into these two themes. To distinguish his 
                                                                                                                                                                            
objectifying nature. It contrasts with other aesthetic experiences, such as of the picturesque or the beautiful, 
which are always experiences of natural objects. 
15
 The flesh of the world as a pure experience is inexpressible in the sense that the sensed world—through 
physical sensations—is the expression of the sentient world; in other words, from the point of view of the 
world itself, which, in Nagel’s terms evoked at the beginning of this essay, is translated by the “what it is like to 
be neither this nor that.” This is not a matter of semantic or incommunicable ineffability, to adopt Spackman’s 
enlightening distinction (2012), since both expressive qualities (this sunrise here, that howling wind there, etc.) 
and the point of view from nowhere (what it is like to be neither this nor that) are demonstrative concepts. On 
the other hand, pure experience is descriptively ineffable in the sense that no description (the origin of life, the 
immensity of space, seasonal atmosphere, etc.), however exhaustive, and whether literal or metaphorical, can 
capture that experience. About the link between ineffability and mystery, see Cooper (2007, 286-295). 
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approach from other versions of acentric aesthetics, Godlovitch qualifies it as “objective-
mystical” (2004, 112). In using the word “mystical,” he seems less to be suggesting a feeling 
of union than a practical attitude, specifically of insignificance and aloofness. 16  The 
observer’s insignificance alludes to the idea of a radical decentering of the self, a self-
renunciation so great that it exhausts any subjective perspective. In its place, there remains 
only a simple experience of the world, from which any particular point of view has 
disappeared. In this, it is similar to numerous accounts relating to mystical experiences of 
nature, which I will re-examine later. For the moment let us bear in mind, as Godlovitch 
points out, that this is not about “taking a God’s-eye view” (2004, 123). 
Aesthetic aloofness, for its part, is meant to help us see the world as indifferent to our own 
interests and preoccupations. In regarding the world from a beetle’s view, we shall have 
done the most important thing, Godlovitch suggests. Finally, the author thinks that through 
death we come closest to the mystery of nature. But then, he adds, “that robs the actor of 
the play, the audience of the actor” (2004, 122). The reader will learn nothing more.  
Can the phenomenological approach adopted earlier teach us anything more about death 
and mystical attitudes? What parallels does it allow us to make between such subjects and 
an acentric aesthetic experience of nature? In the final part of this essay, I would like to 
outline some answers to these questions. 
 
3.1. Death 
Death has been one of the main preoccupations of human existence since the appearance 
of Homo sapiens, in evidence in all cultures and during all eras of humanity. There are at 
least two aspects of a phenomenology of one’s own death: one aspect is temporality and 
the second is so-called “near-death experience.”17 Let us first consider temporality. In his 
one-of-a-kind book, La face cachée du temps (“The Hidden Face of Time”), the philosopher 
and Indianist Michel Hulin (1985) begins by emphasizing that death is not only an empirical 
phenomenon; it is above all something necessary to our being, and prolonging life, even for 
several centuries, would not change anything. But Hulin notes that the contrary—“non-
death”—is equally necessary: I cannot die in that I am not the subject of the action of dying. 
To lose your life, you have to be there to lose it. But if there is no loser, there is nothing to 
lose.  
According to Hulin, this non-death is closely linked to the structure of temporality. The 
present moment is only real with regard to a future that is getting closer to the present and 
to a past toward which the future is aiming. That flow of time makes the very idea of a “last 
moment” inconceivable. “Going beyond time…cannot be accomplished from within time 
itself, by its being interrupted or stopped. Time can only be considered eliminated to the 
extent that an individual consciousness would also be absent which, from its dwelling place 
in the present moment, infinitely unfolds past and future dimensions. But in no way can 
                                                        
16
However, as we will see later on, insignificance and aloofness presuppose such a union. 
17
 This last expression was introduced by the philosopher and psychiatrist Raymond Moody with the 
publication of his book Life after Life in 1975. The author developed the first model of such an experience 
which, incidentally, did not contain any speculation yet about the existence of a possible hereafter. The book 
has since prompted a great deal of hotly debated research and publications. 
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that absence take the form of dying understood in an absurd manner as the process through 
which consciousness leaves time” (Hulin 1985, 28-29). 
How then to resolve the apparent contradiction between the necessity of death and the 
necessity of non-death? Through the presence of the “infinite in the finite,” answers Hulin 
(1985, 29). I can certainly imagine my future death, but I cannot visualize my own death in 
real time. This inaptitude is a symptom, in the present, of a “consciousness of another 
order,” of a “universal Witness” for whom every moment in time is “now” and every part of 
space “here” (1985, 32). This Witness is not outside time and space, but that from which 
time and space unfold. It is the condition that makes possible a shared world and 
intersubjectivity, and constitutes in that sense the “impersonal part of my being” (1985, 33) 
which I share with all other finite consciousness. However, at the same time, it is what is 
most specific to me, as if my individual existence in space and time were only a pale 
physical, psychic and social reflection of it. The other necessity, which makes me a “Being-
toward-death,” as Martin Heidegger said, recalls that I do not coincide with the Witness; 
through my individual existence in time there is a gap with the Witness that it is death’s role 
to fill in.  
The double impossibility with respect to death, observed by Hulin, can be confirmed by 
numerous accounts, in particular by those who have undergone what is now called a “near-
death experience.” Such an experience is the second aspect of a phenomenology of own 
death.18 However, for my purposes it seems one just has to examine the analogy between 
the structure of a (near-)death (or non-death) experience and that relating to an acentric 
aesthetic of nature in the phenomenological sense. As I wrote earlier, an experience of the 
flesh of the world translates a double coincidence—an expressive coincidence between the 
sensed (or perceived) world and the sentient world (the view from nowhere), and an 
imaginative coincidence between the sentient body and the sentient world. Indeed, in a 
death (or non-death) experience, the Witness is expressed in the sensed world through lived 
experience, being merely the impersonal layer of my subjective awareness and that of 
others. 
However, at the same time there is another type of coincidence in this experience, between 
the sentient body (or physical awareness) and the sentient world. It no longer pertains to 
the imagination, but to life: it is the moment when I reach the point of coinciding with the 
Witness, in other words the moment of my death itself, when my body becomes a simple 
worldly object. At that point, there is no lack of any point of view; the sensible—and 
especially my body—is perceived through a perspective with no particular point of view. 
Such a perspective is expressed in well-attested features of near-death experience.19 What 
                                                        
18
 Relatively recent and well-regarded books on the subject include: Braude (2003), Williams Kelly, Greyson, 
and Kelly (2007), Corazza (2008), Sartori (2008), van Lommel (2010), Parnia (2013), and Woollacott (2015). For 
recent critical studies, see Engmann (2014) and Fischer and Mitchell-Yellin (2016). 
19
As showed by Bitbol (2014, 673) two interpretations of near-death experience are possible. They are 
understood either as false narratives of an experience whose illusory reality is due to physiological or 
psychological dysfunction or as true narratives of an experience whose reality is then supranatural. Yet, Bitbol 
notes, “both interpretations present a common feature of great importance. They attribute an objective 
ground to narratives, a material one or a transcendental one” (674). A strictly phenomenological perspective, 
on the contrary, strives to consider them for what they are: narratives of an experience from a “first-person” 
perspective whose characteristics are on one hand exclusivity (the dying situation) and on the other hand self-
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an aesthetic experience of the flesh of the world realizes about the world through 
imagination, the experience of death (or non-death) ultimately realizes through existence. 
Through different modalities, they are both experiences of the mystery of nature. 
 
3.2. The Mystical 
Is there an analogy for the mystical like the one described above? We can start by noting 
that mystical phenomena are very hard to define the scope of or to characterize on a 
phenomenological level, given their protean manifestations and the religious interpretation 
often attributed to mystical experiences by those who have them. Nevertheless, for more 
than a century several philosophers and historians of religion, including Rudolf Otto, Robert 
C. Zaehner, Walter T. Stace and, more recently, Paul Marshall, have taken on the complex 
task of describing these phenomena, highlighting significant features despite numerous 
cultural, religious, and idiosyncratic differences. 
An initial, well-established distinction can be made between introverted mystical 
experiences, often acquired through particular techniques and dealing with the mind, and 
extraverted mystical experiences, often spontaneous and aimed at the outside world (Stace 
1961, 60-61). Only the latter have been taken into consideration here, since extraverted 
mystical experiences are none other than mystical experiences of nature. The essential 
feature of such experiences is a perception of the sensible world in its multiplicity, with an 
intuition of its unity. This unity is experienced in different forms: as a whole, as a paradoxical 
identity of things or as an identity between the subject and object/the world (a union), as an 
eternal present, or an expansion of the field of consciousness, or even a kind of 
transcendence of time and space (Marshall 2005, 50-59).  
Here again, the parallel linking a mystical perception of the world—of its unity in 
multiplicity—and an expressive coincidence between the sensed world and the sentient 
world within an acentric aesthetic experience is striking. What nature shows are things 
themselves, not from the observer’s point of view in their sole diversity. They are perceived 
in their unity, in other words from a perspective that is not specific, one that transcends the 
subjective, fragmented vision we usually have. But how does one reach that point of view 
from nowhere in a mystical experience? 
In an acentric aesthetic experience of the flesh of the world, there is another type of 
coincidence between the sentient body (or physical awareness) and the sentient world. This 
type of coincidence is imaginative because it involves an experience of the flesh of the 
world.20 Another coincidence occurs in extraverted mystical experiences, but without using 
the imagination. It is often based on the sensed world or the sensible, or more directly on 
                                                                                                                                                                            
transformation (long-time effects on the perception of sense of life, choices, and so on). Therefore, if one is 
sensitive in appearing of such experiences (and not in what appears) it can be taken in account of what an 
eminent researcher says about near-death experiences. Van Lommel (2010, 224-225) indeed describes some 
lines of a near-death experience—out-of-body perception, life review, preview and transition from darkness to 
light—as non-local phenomena, that is interconnected out of time and space. 
20
In an acentric aesthetic experience of nature, the imagination is awakened by the flesh, which, through a 
form of envelopment, is both my flesh and the flesh of the world. Nothing equivalent occurs in an extraverted 
mystical experience where expressive coincidence seems to pertain to an intuition from the subject rather 
than from the sensible itself. 
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the sentient body through spiritual practices and other psychological and physiological 
states (Marshall 2005, 82-107). Nevertheless, contrary to introverted mystical experiences, 
extraverted mystical experiences are fortuitous, generally occurring in a spontaneous 
manner with no particular preparation. Thus, there is nothing here that could contribute to 
the coincidence between the sentient body and the sentient world, except for 
consciousness at its most basic, namely “phenomenal” consciousness or, in Nagel’s terms, 
“There is something it is like to be….” 
In that respect, the structure of extraverted mystical experience is similar to the experience 
of death (or non-death). In both cases, the coincidental event occurs without any mediation. 
In an experience of death (or non-death), it is the occurrence of one’s own death that 
creates the (existential) coincidence. In extraverted mystical experience it occurs in the 
present moment of bodily awareness. I describe that coincidence as “spiritual” because it 
highlights the psychic aspect of the sensible world; it then implies the idea that this modality 
of coincidence between the sentient body and the sentient world, between phenomenal 
consciousness and the point of view from nowhere, involves renunciation, letting go and 
decentering. The essence here does not reside in personal identity or self. This seems to be 
a constant in all forms of mystical experience. Some, such as the contemporary mystic 
Bernadette Roberts (1993), have for this reason called it an “experience of no-self.” To 
conclude on this point, through an extraverted mystical experience we encounter the 
mystery of nature in a different way than through the experience of death (or non-death) or 
an acentric aesthetic experience.21 
Consequently, to my mind Godlovitch is absolutely right in evoking death and the mystical 
with regard to an acentric aesthetic experience of nature. That proximity can be confirmed 
through a phenomenological approach. Acentric aesthetic experience, the experience of 
death (or non-death) and extraverted mystical experience constitute three modalities of a 
pure experience of nature during which the point of view from nowhere is expressed in the 
sensible: as three forms of experiencing the mystery of nature. Moreover, all three are 
marked by the insignificance of the subject and aloofness. 
And yet they are not identical. Acentric aesthetic experience differs from the other two in 
that the point of view from nowhere as expressed in the perceived world is mediated 
through the imagination. This form of mediation is not present in an experience of death (or 
non-death) or in extraverted mystical experience; the former is of an existential nature, and 
the latter of a spiritual nature. These two experiences are in fact pure experiences par 
excellence, since both bypass the mental and affective activity of the imaginationin their 
perception of the world’s expressivity: the point of view from nowhere is expressed in 
nature either existentially through my own dying, in other words my death experienced as 
that of the physical body of another, due to the coincidence with the Witness; nor it is 
expressed spiritually through a decentering of the self, in other words an “experience of no-
                                                        
21
Described in this way, mystical experiences of nature echo the “hard problem” evoked by David Chalmers 
with regard to consciousness, namely why cognitive and behavioral functions come with phenomenal 
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self.”22 In addition, contrary to acentric aesthetic experience, experience of death (or non-
death) or extraverted mystical experience are almost always the object of an interpretation 
of that mystery, whether in religious, scientific (psychological, biological, anthropological, 
etc.) or philosophical terms.23 The aesthetic specificity of acentric aesthetic experience 
consists precisely in aesthetically experiencing that mystery—with no finality other than the 
experience itself—by deliberately abstaining from interpreting it. 
 
Conclusion 
In this essay, I have proposed an alternative interpretation to the mystery of nature model 
developed by Godlovith. To that effect I have drawn inspiration from Merleau-Ponty’s 
notion of flesh. The key issue in this development has consisted in providing aesthetic 
meaning to the concept of the ecological self advanced by Naess and thus helping to 
establish its legitimacy. In so doing, I feel ultimately that the alternative suggested for 
Godlovitch’s model has a relationship analogous to that of Naess’ conception toward 
Reed’s. If attitudes of insignificance and aloofness are indeed characteristics of acentric 
aesthetic experience, I do not believe they lead to seeing nature as an externality 
categorically different from us. Godlovitch describes his understanding of acentric 
experience as “mystical.” Yet, as we have seen, the idea of unity, in whatever form, is a key 
feature of mystical phenomena. It is hardly compatible with an external point of view of the 
world; nor is an experience of death (or non-death). Furthermore, as we know from the 
theory of evolution and scientific ecology, we are an integral part of nature. A satisfactory 
aesthetic theory of the environment must be in line with this holistic vision of things.  
It thus appears that the debate between Reed and Naess on an adequate concept of the 
human relationship to nature leads us to opt for Naess’s vision. Humans are not apart from 
nature, as Reed asserts; on the contrary, humans are part of it. A phenomenological version 
of acentric aesthetic experience thus supports the idea according to which deep ecological 
self-realization is a fertile vision of what it means to belong to nature. And this realization 
implies a process of identification in which the well-being of others is tied to one’s own well-
being (Naess 1989, 175; 1999, 200). 
Through phenomenology I have tried to show that it is possible to imagine an acentric 
aesthetic experience without necessarily placing oneself outside nature. A point of view 
                                                        
22
 Expressive content of death (or non-death) experience and extraverted mystical experience are no more 
mediated by imagination—a subject who imagines. While apparently presenting a mental and affective 
dimension, it becomes the content of an experience without subject (death, no-self).  
23
 On a philosophical level, my intention in this essay is limited to a so-called “narrow” or “strict” 
phenomenology because the descriptions are those of a lived body in nature and of what appears to it. 
However, such a phenomenology could be extended with metaphysics of nature by Robert S. Corrington 
(2016, 2017), who calls it “ordinal phenomenology” (2017, xii). Relative to an ecstatic naturalism (Corrington 
1994) ordinal phenomenology describes nature in its twofold aspect: as naturanaturans, which means the 
creative and hidden dimension of nature, and as naturanaturata, which are uncountable orders and 
components of the world (material, biological, economical, artistic, pragmatic, spiritual, and so on). Yet 
naturanaturans and naturanaturata are encompassed by nothingness. In this context, ecological self and my 
aesthetic interpretation of it is close to the process described by Corrington in his ordinal phenomenology as 
“Selving process” (2016, xxiii-xxiv). In ecological self-realization humans are also in tension between their place 
in naturanaturata (a body in nature) and the potentialities of naturanaturans (the view from nowhere). 
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from nowhere that goes beyond any privileged perspective can be adopted from inside the 
world, as close as possible to it. Yet, it still requires the subject’s insignificance and 
aloofness. Have we returned, then, to the very anthropocentrism that Godlovitch wished to 
transcendand that Naess rejects categorically? Clearly the posture has nothing to do with 
moral anthropocentrism. And yet, doesn’t a phenomenological interpretation of acentric 
aesthetic experience entail a form of anthropocentrism that could be described as 
“epistemic”? I do not think so. The anthropocentrist bias arises more in creations of the 
human psyche, societies, or culture than through the lived body; whereas a practical stance 
in an acentric aesthetic of nature—insignificance and aesthetic aloofness—involves ridding 
oneself of the cultural, social and psychological frameworks through which nature is 
apprehended.24 
Moreover, the phenomenological approach has shown that an acentric aesthetic experience 
of nature is a pure experience. The mystery of nature comes to light not through categories 
of the mind, but in an experience that is both de-objectified and de-subjectified. This is 
clearly confirmed in the close kinship between an extraverted mystical experience and 
acentric aesthetic experience.  
This developmentas a whole suggests that an acentric experience of nature as we have 
explored it is in a sense an aesthetic equivalent of the ecological self. And, just as 
identification underlies the ecological self, the double—imaginative and expressive—
coincidence underlies acentric aesthetic experience. To employ Naess’s terms, “deep, 
comprehensive ecological” self-realization consists in going beyond the subjective human 
point of view in order to see human and non-human interests as one’s own. However, a 
phenomenological model of acentric aesthetic experience allows us to go further: as I see it, 
self-realization aims in fine to achieve the view from nowhere as I have attempted to define 
it. This point of view now appears to be an indispensable condition in bringing together 
various interests, or certain of them: I can only envision legitimately bringing together 
human and non-human interests such as those of the ecological self by situating myself—for 
a moment at least—beyond the human and non-human point of view. In so doing, this 
aesthetic approach also shows the proximity that the ecological self has, on the one hand, 
to the fundamental biological life cycle of birth and death, and on the other hand, to 
mystical experience, without being identical to it. 
In conclusion, as a phenomenological version of the aesthetics of the mystery of nature 
prompts us to think, the ethical ramifications of the ecological self extend beyond the 
question of otherness and identity, contrary to what has been maintained (Plumwood 1993, 
173-182; 1999). I do not believe the mystery of nature lies in its otherness, as Godlovitch or 
Reed maintain. Nature’s otherness is not mysterious: it is, and it is simply a matter of 
recognizing that when such a relationship occurs. The true mystery is elsewhere. It is 
experienced through the fact that nature surrounds us, that it contains us and that, despite 
everything, we can have that holistic experience. The mystery of nature is the fact that 
                                                        
24
 This debate is accurate in some interpretations of the last work of Merleau-Ponty, The Visible and the 
Invisible (James 2016). I think this work goes beyond epistemic anthropocentrism. As Simon J. James writes: 
“the guiding question is no longer ‘What is perceived?’ but ‘Who (or what) is perceiving?.’ … What we 




Volume 33, No. 1 (2017) 
 
Gérald Hess 17 
there is experience in nature and that nature is experience (Mathews 2003).25 Rather than 
an experience of the world’s otherness, it is more fundamentally the condition that makes it 




























                                                        
25
 Such an experience obviously is not necessarily a human one. Moreover, note that the formulation 
condenses the two approaches described by Reed (1989): humans as part of nature and nature as part of 
humans. Also see footnote 1 above. 
26
 I thank warmly Emily Brady for helpful comments on a previous draft of this paper and William Snow for his 
support in translating it into English. 
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